Andrey Sushentsov
The main issue to be decided was the future of NATO, which had been established as a counterbalance to the Soviet Union. However, starting in 1991, the Soviet Union lost control over the events in Central and Eastern Europe. Communist governments fell, the Warsaw Pact dissolved, and the West had no impetus to engage in any negotiations or agreements with Moscow.
10 november 2014 | 23:00

Can Russia and NATO agree to disagree?

The Ukrainian crisis is just the latest example of this failure of the Russian Federation and the West to create a post-Cold War world order.

The text was originally published in Russia Beyond the Headlines

The debate over European security turns on the different ways Russia and the West interpret NATO’s expansion. These interpretations, for their part, are rooted in the different ways the parties view the end of the Cold War.


According to Russian leaders, the Cold War ended as a result of the joint efforts of the Soviet Union and the United States in the late 1980s to move from a relationship based on confrontation to one focused on cooperation.

After the agreed-upon end to confrontation, the Russians expected the sides would jointly determine the future of the areas where their interests overlapped, primarily European security.

The main issue to be decided was the future of NATO, which had been established as a counterbalance to the Soviet Union.

In the late 1980s, during talks on the future of Germany, the subject of how German reunification would affect NATO was frequently discussed. As part of the discussions, the Soviet Union agreed not to oppose German reunification and NATO member states agreed not to deploy the alliance’s military infrastructure in East Germany – an agreement they honor still.

However, there was much debate as to whether the agreement not to expand eastward would apply only to East Germany or to Eastern Europe generally. According to the personal notes of U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, the subject was discussed in a conversation with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow in February 1990. But Baker’s notes are inconclusive as to how the parties left the issue. What can be said is that despite the fact that the Soviet Union was clear in its adamant opposition to NATO enlargement, no agreement guaranteeing that there would be no expansion was signed.


During the discussions in 1989-1990, the issue did not come up because the Warsaw Pact was still in place.


However, starting in 1991, the Soviet Union lost control over the events in Central and Eastern Europe. Communist governments fell, the Warsaw Pact dissolved, and the West had no impetus to engage in any negotiations or agreements with Moscow.


Motivation to negotiate with Moscow further decreased with the breakup of the Soviet Union. Under Boris Yeltsin, Russia not only set aside Soviet demands for guarantees that NATO would not expand, but even toyed with the idea of joining the alliance itself.


In 1990, Yeltsin, then chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet, wrote:


“In what appears to be almost a mockery of our four and a bit years of perestroika, in a matter of days, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria made such a leap from the past towards a normal, humane, civilized society that it is no longer clear if we shall ever be able to catch up with them.”


These words explain why Russia was so tolerant of former Warsaw Pact members’ aspirations to join NATO.


For their part, members of the North Atlantic Alliance perceived the situation as a clear victory, and put forward a program to turn the bloc into a universal security organization.


In this context, Russia lost its status as an equal partner and became, as far as NATO was concerned, just another country that the alliance would deal with on its own terms.


From these beginnings grew profound imbalances in European security, which caused ongoing disagreements between Russia and NATO starting from the mid-1990s. Over time, omissions and reticence led to a complete breakdown of understanding between the parties. In effect, the West failed to create a coherent and purposeful policy for working with Russia.


It was customary to believe that Moscow was moving toward the West, and therefore the West could not do Russia any harm by acting unilaterally. While the goal of this policy was not to ignore Moscow’s interests, in practice, that was exactly what it did.


This approach did not change, even after the first serious disagreements between Russia and NATO erupted during the conflicts in the Balkans. At that time, the West acted unilaterally on its own interpretations of how to ensure European security, which included expanding NATO and deploying U.S. missiles in eastern Europe. When Russia balked at these moves, Washington and Brussels responded that Russia could also take whatever steps it felt were necessary.


The West was not concerned with the corresponding steps Russia was taking to strengthen its own security because it believed that Moscow was not an adversary and did not represent a credible threat. The widely held belief was that while Russia wanted equal partnership, it was not an equal partner.


A divergence of interests prompted Russia to reassess its priorities in its relations with the West. Moscow’s hopes to establish a new world order on equal terms with all parties remained unfulfilled. On numerous occasions, the United States and NATO unilaterally used force in conflicts. Russia’s independent foreign policy, aimed at ensuring its own interests, met with increasing criticism in the West.


The Ukrainian crisis is just the latest example of Russia and the West’s failure create a post-Cold War world order. To prevent future conflicts in Europe, Russia and the West should agree on new rules of engagement, both in Europe and in the rest of the world.


15 january 2014 | 23:00

Chechnya′s silent diplomacy in the Middle East

With more than 20 million Muslims and an observer status at the OIC, Russia clearly needs such channels. Now that it seems to be on the offensive in the Middle East, it certainly will try to make the most of them despite serious domestic constraints. The North Caucasus is becoming an integral part of Russian Middle Eastern policy, since many of Moscow’s initiatives in the region are driven largely by the imperatives of its own turbulent area. Be it Syria, the Kurds or Chechnya, Russia learns the craft of turning its domestic challenges into opportunities in the Middle East.

1 may 2014 | 23:00

Russian policy in Ukraine, Mideast not just about Putin

Today’s Russia wants its voice to be heard, not to mention decisively, in most acute regional issues, be it the Iranian nuclear issue or the Syrian crisis. Although President Barack Obama considers Russia a “regional power” — an assertion that upset many Russians, including decision-makers, which is telling — whenever a grave challenge emerges in the Middle East or anywhere else in the world, Washington can expect little progress if it fails to enlist Moscow’s support, as recently concerning Afghanistan and Iran.

20 april 2015 | 23:00

Moscow and Beijing must learn to be upfront with each other

The visit of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to Russia on April 6-8 was widely covered in the media and caused a new wave of enthusiasm about the future of Russian-Chinese relations. However, Wang's trip was rather technical in nature, being made in preparation for the visit of Chinese leader Xi Jinping to Moscow to take part in ceremonies marking the 70th anniversary of the allied victory in World War II.

23 january 2014 | 23:00

Proposed reforms will not stop pervasive N.S.A. snooping

The cosmetic nature of Obama’s reforms is not really down to his desire to stay on good terms with the intelligence community. Neither is he especially keen to keep all Americans under close surveillance. This is more likely a matter of simply accepting the reality.

What′s your opinion on this?

This material is a part of several dossiers
19 september 2016 | 10:30
7 april 2016 | 20:00
10 april 2015 | 21:00
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23 march 2015 | 21:00
18 december 2014 | 21:00
10 november 2014 | 23:00
9 december 2013 | 23:00
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