Saudi Arabia

Tensions within Saudi Arabia and on its borders keep worsening. In the meantime, the young Crown Prince, who holds power over most vital domestic and external policies, continues multiplying mistakes. As was expected, 2017 witnessed the two mutually reinforcing tendencies. First, Prince Mohammed bin Salman, son of the current Saudi King, held on to his course of strengthening his positions in power. Second, tensions kept increasing within the royal family in the face of the upcoming change of the order of succession to the throne.

Last week saw increased international security concerns as North Korea claimed to have tested a hydrogen bomb and the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran took another turn for the worse. However, there has been no credible evidence that North Korea actually did test such a device, and even if it did, little is known of the weapon's characteristics. Similarly, Saudi Arabia's provocative behavior could be nothing more than a show of force. Even so, Russia cannot ignore either of these events and the risks that they bring.

Russia’s image in the Gulf is rather negative. The source of this perception lies in Moscow’s reading of the Arab Spring. Russia has been skeptical about the nature of the revolts, which subsequently became a bone of contention between Moscow and the GCC. Since the beginning of the rebellions about five years ago, Russia gained the reputation of being a major spoiler in the Middle East. Russians see little hope in trying to improve their image among the Gulf states.

Russia is also anything but willing to get involved in the Iran-Saudi face-off, let alone the greater Shiite-Sunni showdown in the region. Having no immediate stakes in the struggle but rather long-term interests in the region as a whole, it feels reluctant to recognize the Houthis' rule officially, but it doesn’t give up on the contacts either. Now that everyone is looking for allies in the fight against the Islamic State (IS), Russia may side with the Houthis, who bear their own grudge against Sunni Islamists.

With more than 20 million Muslims and an observer status at the OIC, Russia clearly needs such channels. Now that it seems to be on the offensive in the Middle East, it certainly will try to make the most of them despite serious domestic constraints. The North Caucasus is becoming an integral part of Russian Middle Eastern policy, since many of Moscow’s initiatives in the region are driven largely by the imperatives of its own turbulent area. Be it Syria, the Kurds or Chechnya, Russia learns the craft of turning its domestic challenges into opportunities in the Middle East.