The United States is backpedaling – reducing the range of tasks, gathering the resources of its allies, separating the timeframes for reaching its goals. An authentic review of the priorities of American policy will occur if and when the resources of adaptation strategy are exhausted.
The causes of this division lie deep in history. Independent Ukraine has existed within its present borders only for the past 22 years. The state was formed by the Bolsheviks from different cultural parts. Some had been ruled previously by Russia and others, mostly in the West, had been part of Poland for centuries. The people of these regions have completely different perceptions of national identity and history.
Over time, the Kurds established cultural centers in Russia’s two biggest cities, Moscow and St. Petersburg, to preserve their identity and culture. At the same time, their influence over regional sociopolitical processes remained fairly limited, thus keeping them off the radar of local officials. But with the ongoing war in Syria, tensions in Turkey and serious divisions in Iraq, the Kurdish issue acquires a greater international dimension for Russia.
It is most likely that, after 2014, the situation in Afghanistan will develop according to the “Iraqi Scenario,” repeating the series of events after the U.S. troops withdrew from that country. This means the continuation of terrorist activity against a background of a relatively stable central government that protects the state system without the help of foreign troops.
The president may be playing a strategic game to gain benefits from both the EU and Russia by continuing to manouevre between them, as Ukraine has done for some time. But there are also two short-term electoral imperatives.
A resolution to the Syrian crisis shows the increasing importance of pragmatism and common sense in resolving complex diplomatic issues.
In the Russian public consciousness, however, the South Caucasus and its problems are viewed less through the lens of ideology and more as a pragmatic reality. Nevertheless, the Russian side needs guarantees that an attack similar to the Georgian aggression of 2008 will never be repeated.
At present, the shape and structure of the military presence that will remain in 2014 is still unknown, but the vacuum left by the withdrawal will pose a challenge to the security environment in both Afghanistan and the surrounding region, including the three neighboring Central Asian states of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.